The US/UN Military Humanitarian Intervention (MHI) in Somalia has given rise to a vast body of writing to which the MHI's relationships with Somalis and its devastating political and moral impact on them have often remained incidental. This article focusses on how the MHI in Somalia, taken as a 2 whole, was unable to keep or enforce peace; failed to benefit the humanitarian wellbeing and human rights of ordinary Somalis, and itself caused the latter new violence. With the benefit of hindsight and drawing on recent political and military memoirs, this article analyzes how the US leadership of the MHI's first stage (UNITAF) used the discourse of a 'politics-free' humanitarianism to pursue policies that empowered Somali perpetrators of crimes against humanity, undermined the wellbeing of common Somalis and set the UN up for failure in the MHI's second stage (UNOSOM II). It further shows that, during this second stage, the MHI's military dimension came to overwhelm its humanitarian and peacebuilding focus so that even US/UN drawdown and troop withdrawal rewarded the very Somali perpetrators of crimes against humanity whose violence had provoked the MHI's military overreach and disaster. By evaluating the MHI's actions in, and impact on Somalia, and assessing it as a stage in increasingly militarized global approaches to 'First World' interventions into 'Third World' lives, this article cautions against uncritical support for MHIs as tools for preventing and containing the largescale violence and human suffering that characterize complex emergencies.
Introduction
No chapter of Somali history has received more attention from international political analysts and scholars than the US/UN Military Humanitarian Intervention (MHI) in Somalia of 1992-1995, and few cases of MHI have given rise to a larger literature of 'lessons learned' than that about the MHI in Somalia. This body of writing is vast. It includes practical proposals to increase the success of future MHIs, as well as more philosophical questions about subjects such as just war theory, the meanings of sovereignty, and the nature and history of humanitarianism and its relationship to human rights. Most recently, the MHI in Somalia, together with other examples of interventions in the context of 'complex emergencies', 2 has informed analyses of the global political economy and the relationship between the 'developed' countries of the global North and the 'underdeveloped' countries of the global South. 3 In all these contexts, the story of the MHI in Somalia has been told, retold, and retold again in the service of larger arguments about the Post-Cold War world and the roles in it of the UN, US, humanitarian relief organizations, non-governmental organizations, and other powerful, national and international political institutions.
Very few of these studies trace the history of the MHI in relationship to political developments inside Somalia or consider the impact on Somalia and common Somalis. Moreover, many repeat US political spin about the first, US-led stage of the MHI, which simply blames the UN for overreach in the MHI's second, UN-led stage. This spin conceals important causes of failure, including how US political leadership, priding itself on its pragmatic attitude towards the politics of 'people like that', knowingly enabled the worst perpetrators of crimes against humanity and, in its hurry to get out of Somalia, set the UN up for failure.
It is the objective of this article is to present, twenty-one years after the launch of the MHI, an updated, concise and critical synthesis and evaluation of the MHI in Somalia that debunks this spin and tries to answer more fully three questions that matter to current debates about the role of MHIs in preventing or containing humanitarian disasters and occurrences of large-scale violence against civilians. First, how did the label of humanitarianism, from the beginning, make possible an antipolitical, 4 allegedly politics-free public stance that concealed an intensely political and unethical set of efforts to contain 'Third World' crises.
Background to the situation in Somalia
The for obliteration and expulsion, it welcomed into its midst those top leaders of the Barre regime who were of its own clan. The USC's targeted campaign of clan-based mass killings and expulsions of tens of thousands of individuals lasted more than two years and affected some of northwest and all of southcentral and southern Somalia. 6 Because international attention was focussed on the expulsion of the dictator and the inciters to clan cleansing controlled access to news from Somalia, the nature of this large-scale clan-based violence against civilians was at the time largely ignored.
Some of the survivors of this clan-cleansing campaign reorganized militarily and struck back at the USC and its allies, also committing atrocities. As the battle lines moved back and forth, clan-based militias in shifting alliances with either of these two sides, as well as gangs of free-booting thugs, killed, raped and looted whatever they could use or sell abroad, purposefully targeting civilian populations associated with enemy clans. 7 This 'war of the militias', exacerbated by a region-wide drought, caused a devastating famine whose total number of victims is estimated at approximately 212,000-248,000. 8 The humanitarian relief organizations (HROs) involved in delivering food aid to the starving found roads blocked, convoys attacked and food diverted. These circumstances continued even after they began to hire thousands of Somali armed guards from the very warlords whose clan-based militias were attacking their convoys. 9 It was the famine that prompted first the food airlift from Kenya (Operation Provide Relief, August-December 1992), in which the US military participated, and then the dispatch of a tiny UN peacekeeping mission (UNOSOM I, June 1991 -February 1992 There were other influences on the US's decision to intervene. The role of the press-the socalled 'CNN effect'-has been exaggerated as a causal factor of UNITAF, 20 but the intensive lobbying for a US military intervention by HROs already working in Somalia, especially by the director of CARE, played an important and, in the eyes of some, unseemly role. 21 The few humanitarian and human rights organizations that spoke out against the MHI in Somalia argued that more limited alternatives had not been exhausted and that the intervention was based on false information about the Somali situation and would not solve the political crisis in Somalia.
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The core-principles of UNITAF, as articulated by Bush and Powell and repeated as mantra by UNITAF's leadership in Somalia, were its premise of overwhelming military force, its narrow interpretation of its mandate's humanitarian focus, and the brief time-span of the operation. Over time,
analysts and scholars have come to see all these core-principles as liabilities to the operation's success as measured in humanitarian terms, that is to say by improvements in the lives of ordinary Somalis.
The analysis that follows will highlight five aspects of the UNITAF stage of the MHI: the unsound politics behind the humanitarian façade; the disdain for Somali politics; the enabling of warlords, especially of the USC's General Aidid, and the refusal to seriously undertake disarmament and institution building, which undermined both the MHI and the UN.
UNITAF: flawed politics behind a humanitarian façade
The politics behind the humanitarian façade Few analysts contest that UNITAF's 39,000 troops, especially the 28,000 US troops with their awesome logistical capacity, successfully opened up corridors for food convoys; built, repaired and upgraded port facilities, air strips and roads, and established nine Human Relief Sectors that covered the worst-affected parts of south and south-central Somalia. An estimated number of 10,000-15,000 individuals were saved from starvation during UNITAF's brief time-span, fewer than expected because the famine turned out to have peaked when the MHI began. 23 Six weeks after the 9 December 1992 landing, UNITAF's military commanders announced that their mission had been accomplished and that they were ready to hand over to the UN. 24 However, while achieving this initial security for certain corridors of humanitarian relief distribution, UNITAF's presence and policies had a political impact that had immediately begun to undermine that security.
UNITAF leadership's constantly repeated public claims that the MHI would not influence the balance of power between the parties of the conflict in Somalia were of course unrealistic. 25 That largescale food aid in the context of a 'complex emergency' such as Somalia inevitably had political consequences, even in the absence of a military dimension, had been well established by the time UNITAF was launched. 26 Given that the Somali famine was 'man-made', that is to say, was caused, in the context of drought, by warlords who used food and food aid to support their own war machine and prevented it from reaching civilians considered hostile or just insignificant to their cause, it was evident that UNITAF's military presence in Somalia would have a political impact on these warlords. The failure to admit this and publicly articulate an overarching political strategy and vision for Somalia created an arbitrary and murky space in which Oakley and his team took actions that were inherently and intentionally political and partial.
This was obvious even before the UNITAF troops landed on 9 December. Because Mogadishu was to be the major entry point of the troops, Oakley had brokered a fragile reconciliation between the two Mogadishu warlords, M. F. Aidid and Ali Mahdi. By giving them official recognition and even flying their representatives to the UN headquarters in New York, UNITAF raised their importance not only vis-à-vis the other leaders of armed, clan-based factions, but also in relation to ordinary civilians.
Given that the port, airport, and the now reclaimed, huge US embassy compound, were located in South Mogadishu, Aidid's turf, UNITAF's decision to establish both the US and UN headquarters there made some practical sense but also had political implications. As the US military commanders bunked down in the ruins of the embassy compound, Oakley rented the so-called Conoco compound, located at a stone's throw of Aidid's own residence in a neighbourhood largely owned by Hasan Osman 'Aato, Aidid's major financier and arms supplier. 27 Over the whole duration of the MHI, even when the US mounted the search-and-capture-Aidid mission in the summer of 1993, huge amounts of moneyliterally hundreds of thousands of dollars-poured into Aidid's faction's coffers for the rent of large villas, 'technicals' and their crews of armed guards, and other services that made up Aidid's protection racket. All of these decisions were political. Moreover, they not only favored Aidid but also flew in the face of the policy of regionalization initiated during UNOSOM I, which would have avoided making
Mogadishu and its two leading armed-faction leaders the major focus. to Somali politics and political players. 31 Rejecting the UN's agenda and refusing to publicly articulate a political agenda to which UNITAF's military force could be harnessed, Oakley filled the political space UNITAF opened up with his own highly subjective, intensely political, often improvised, and ultimately inconsistent attitudes and policies. 32 A significant aspect of Oakley's political subjectivity was his attitude towards Somali politics.
Oakley saw Somali sectarian politics through the lens of his experiences at the US embassy in Beirut.
The lesson he had drawn from Hizbullah's massacre of 241 Marines there in October of 1983 was that the US should not become mired in this kind of politics and should avoid making permanent enemies or being perceived as partisan at all costs. Getting local politics wrong, being caught in the middle of other people's civil wars, imposing external values unsuitable to their culture, and anything that smacked of 'nation-building' (as he called all forms of internationally-assisted institution-building) was anathema to him. He found Somalia and its 'often violent struggles between clans' exceptionally hard to understand and regarded it as an 'unusually poor choice for' an 'experiment in "nation-building'". 33 This attitude towards interventions in general and his view of Somalis as 'others' whose sectarian politics were unsolvable blinded Oakley to ethical issues that should have been relevant to a peacekeeping mission. 34 One such aspect was that General Aidid was guilty crimes against humanity that were still ongoing in December 1992. 35 
Waltzing with warlords, building up Aidid, and undermining the UN
Given that the clan-cleansing campaign and the war of the militias had been the major cause of the famine that triggered the MHI, it came as a shock to many Somali and other observers that Oakley and UNITAF, immediately upon arrival, embraced Aidid and 'waltzed with the warlords' more generally.
They wondered how large-scale crimes against humanity could be irrelevant to a humanitarian intervention 36 and why UNITAF would bring in 39,000 troops to simply rush to treat as legitimate authorities a set of warlords who deserved to be hauled in front of a criminal court. 37 Oakley's claims to political neutrality and impartiality were further discredited when he favored some warlords over others. 'He was right', Zinni commented. 'None of the warlords had anything like it'. 40 In sum, Oakley and UNITAF's favoring of Aidid appears to have been in part inadvertent, as the General controlled the most strategic part of Mogadishu; in part politically opportunistic, as Aidid appeared to be the strongman most likely to win; in part personal, as Oakley bore grudges against men formerly in the Barre camp who were now Aidid's enemies, and in part a tactic and ruse to keep Aidid hopeful and cooperative. 41 All of these attitudes and policies, however, had real and ultimately counterproductive political implications and consequences.
Oakley's embrace of Aidid also played a role in UNITAF's relationship with the UN. From even before UNITAF troops had arrived, Aidid had managed to play the US and UN off against each other. Although UNITAF was a 'unified mission', in reality it was run by the US team, with Oakley encroaching on the UN's authority to oversee relations with the Somalis and the UN's Ismat Kittani, who was reportedly resentful, non-collaborative, and totally overshadowed and outclassed. 42 45 In response, Boutros-Ghali refused to commit to a date for the handover. 46 The second policy area in which the US team disregarded and even derided and ridiculed the UN was that of institution building. Shaped in part by his experience in Vietnam, where he had been charged with building democratic institutions just before US military withdrawal and the capture of the South by communist North Vietnam, Oakley (as well as Johnston and Powell) repeatedly spoke out against chasing the chimera of institution-and 'nation-building'. 47 They would later falsely attribute the failure of the UN-led, second stage of the MHI to the UN's misguided ambition for 'nation-building'. 48 As Powell disdainfully and caustically put it, 'Boutros-Ghali reasoned that since the catastrophe had been provoked by feuding fourteenth-century-style warlords, the solution was a dose of twentiethcentury-style democracy'. 49 However, the UNITAF plot thickens further for, in spite of all statements to the contrary, the opposites of the policies outlined above were also pursued. Thus, in the course of February 1993 and perhaps under pressure of the State Department, UNITAF also began to pursue grass-roots alternatives to warlord rule by holding town meetings, setting up district and regional councils, and establishing a small police force in four cities. 50 This was definitely institution building. Oakley and Zinni later somewhat minimized these efforts, Oakley by referring to them as minor 'extra-curricular activities'
and Zinni by calling them 'mission-creep', explaining how one thing led to another. 51 What is more, in spite of the adamant rejection of any suggestions that it undertake a campaign of disarmament, UNITAF's troops did engage in such a process, although they did so intermittently, inconsistently, and sometimes arbitrarily, claiming it as an achievement and maintaining deniability at the same time. confidence in the security of the environment. 54 It appears that this incident soured Oakley on Aidid.
Around this same time Oakley publicly characterized his policy towards the warlords as gradually plucking the feathers from a bird until the unsuspecting animal suddenly found it could no longer fly 55 and emphasized that 'I haven't seen anyone here who I would think of as a national figure'. 56 Thus
Aidid had been alienated well before the transition to UNOSOM II on 4 May and UNITAF's policy towards the general had already begun to collapse under its own contradictions. 57 
Setting the UN up for failure
Any hope that a two-track policy of encouraging civilian grassroots leadership and marginalizing the warlords might succeed was cut short by UNITAF's short time-span, insisted on by both the Pentagon and military authorities on the ground. Johnston had begun to withdraw some troops in mid-January and on 4 February 1993 had declared UNITAF's mission accomplished. 58 However, the more time passed, the less stable the security environment proved to be. Desperate to get out, the UNITAF team turned up the positive political spin. The Washington Post of 3 March read: Oakley 'was upbeat about the accomplishments of the US military mission here. Starvation has ended, feeding stations are being turned into schools, and the days of clan warfare, "which has taken so many Somali lives, is virtually gone", he said'. 59 Oakley had added, somewhat cynically, 'You can't travel around Mogadishu in a car without being in great danger of robbery. But at least you can walk around with food'. 60 When Johnston and Zinni were finally able to leave Somalia, two months after Oakley's departure, their confidence in the security situation in Mogadishu had plummeted further. As they were driving to the airport, immediately after the official handover ceremony, Johnston stopped the convoy.
Zinni described the scene that followed: 'He looked up at the bright sunny sky. "I give this place thirty days", he said, "and then it's all going to hell"'. 'Thirty days later', Zinni added, referring to Aidid's 6
June attack on the Pakistani peacekeepers, 'this prediction came true'. 61 However, when the UN officially asked Johnston about the worst case-scenario in Somalia, he had referred only to street riots such as the demonstrations organized by Aidid at the end of February 1993. 62 Within hours of the hand-over ceremony, the last US Marines were withdrawn from Mogadishu. Apparently only Powell was aware of this sudden departure, as not even the State Department, let alone the UN, had been informed. Richard Clarke of the National Security Council later described his surprise: 'UNITAF bolted out of Somalia', he said, 'and there was a security vacuum that UNOSOM was never able to fill'. 63 Admiral Jonathan Howe, the incoming UN Special
Representative who was to head UNOSOM II, noted with bitterness that the 'UNITAF commanders defined victory by getting out, not getting the job done'. 64 Thus UNITAF, in early May 1993, 'bolted out of Somalia' with its military commanders explicitly denying in public what they acknowledged in private: that the security situation they were handing over to UNOSOM II was partial, fragile, and, especially in Mogadishu, only apparent. 65 The analysis that follows emphasizes UNOSOM II's humanitarian dimension as measured by its impact on Somali wellbeing and its military dimension as characterized by its increased dependence on the US military. Somali agency, especially the actions of Aidid, also forms a major theme. Although UNOSOM II inherited from UNITAF a hazardous security situation, in its own right too it proved to be flawed in practically all its aspects. 67 These defects included, apart from the UN's own handling of the transition, its ambiguous approach to Somali sovereignty; 68 its convoluted and non-unified command structure; its weak and underdeveloped civilian support structure; the contradictory rules of engagement observed by the thirty-something different national troop contingents that made up the UNOSOM II coalition; its inconsistent observance of humanitarian law and disregard for human rights violations, and its unprincipled, cowardly, and wasteful relations with Somalis.
UNOSOM II: A disastrous military end to a political and humanitarian program
In combination with the continued insecurity of the overall environment, UNOSOM II's failure to translate its political goals into concrete policies and operational stages resulted in a stark contradiction and irony: in the very mission that set out to rectify UNITAF's narrow interpretation of its mandate, it was demands for security and thus a narrowly military dimension that came to dominate.
This led to a second contradictory aspect of the operation, namely that authority came to be concentrated in US hands, US military hands. In theory and in contrast to UNITAF, UNOSOM II was a peace enforcement mission led by the UN, with overall authority invested in the Special Representative of the Secretary General. Nevertheless, given the command structure worked out between Washington and New York, it was US military men who dominated the top leadership and it was US military approaches and operations that came to overwhelm the still-born political agenda and-in circumstances in which Somali agency played a crucial role-caused failure. 69 In this process, as a third irony, UNOSOM II's avowed humanitarian concerns for Somali wellbeing were trampled under foot.
Military endgame: the war with Aidid
The story of UNOSOM II's slide into urban warfare against General Aidid is part of the oft-repeated story of 'Black-Hawk-down'. Before June 1993, a number of incidents, some of them perhaps poorly handled by UNOSOM II and exploited by Aidid, had intensified the latter's alienation, which pre-dated the handover. However, 6 June 1993 became a watershed. On that date, when a group of Pakistani peacekeepers received orders to inspect one of Aidid's authorized weapons storage sites that also housed his Somali-language radio station, the general's supporters attacked Pakistani soldiers in different parts of town, killing twenty-four (of whom some were mutilated) and wounding many more.
Whether the way and context in which this inspection was carried out was provocative or not-it was-and whether the violence was planned and ordered by Aidid or not-it indeed was-letting this show of grisly violence simply pass without any response would have meant jeopardizing UNOSOM II's mission as a whole. 70 As Menkhaus put it, the question is not whether UNOSOM II should have responded but whether it did so effectively. 71 As it happened, after a hasty Security Council Resolution charging it to apprehend those responsible for the killings, UNOSOM II went to war against Aidid.
However, the fate of this war was ultimately determined by UNOSOM II's US military commanders, taking their orders from the US military and using US special forces and military hardware.
The campaign of air attacks on Mogadishu went on for three months. It terrified and humiliated Somali residents of the targeted neighbourhoods of the city with loud noise and rotor-wash and caused high levels of death and devastation. 72 Some attacks, such as the air assault of 12 July on the house where faction leaders and clan elders had apparently gathered to call Aidid to account, killed scores of civilians and were clear violations of humanitarian law. 73 It was in this highly charged context, in which Aidid became both a hero and a terrible liability to his own supporters, that on 3 October 1993 US special forces unit Task Force Ranger mounted a 'surgical operation' that ran into trouble. When
Aidid's militiamen shot down two Black Hawk helicopters above their neighbourhood, the remaining US soldiers were pinned down. Only the next morning, after a firefight of sixteen hours, could they be rescued. The Somali fighters killed eighteen US soldiers, mutilated the bodies of several, and-staging savagery as a taunt and deterrent-dragged two half-naked bodies through the streets. 
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After the final withdrawal of US troops in March 1994, UNOSOM II hung on for another year.
By then it had become little more than 'a self-licking ice cream'. 79 What of the daily expenditure of $2.5 million dollars was not simply spent on sustaining the huge mission was largely paid out as protection moneys to the very warlords who made such protection indispensable, including very prominently General Aidid. For a while, around February 1994, there were reportedly even plans to try to constitute a national government headed by Aidid. 80 Unable to distinguish Somali friends and foes, UNOSOM II ended up mistrusting all and mistreating many. The remaining UN personnel, now almost exclusively drawn from developing countries, hunkered down behind the eighty-acre walled UN compound dubbed 'MogaDisney', in Hartley's words, 'a sort of theme park to the New World Order'. 81 This further normalized views that the 'Sammies' and 'Skinnies' residing outside, in 'Indian territory', were despised and savage racial others. 82 By the time drawn-down ended on 15 March 1995, the crew-served weapons such as quad fifty antiaircraft guns)' to defeat the 'bad guys'. 84 Zinni had to stand by as Aidid, in violation of the agreements made, took over the airport, 85 and later felt compelled to order his snipers to 'take out' a number of 'rogue gunmen'. When news reporters later pressed him for the numbers killed, Zinni writes: 'My response got a lot of coverage. "I don't count bodies", I
countered. "This isn't Vietnam"'. 86 This expression of military license is a measure of the fate of UNOSOM II's lofty goals. The section below will analyze UNOSOM II's impact on the wellbeing of common Somalis in more detail.
The failure to protect ordinary Somalis
Like UNITAF, UNOSOM II ended up empowering the very warlords who were undermining its success. It had opened in May 1993 with a commitment to developing Somali political institutions beyond the armed factions of the warlords and their clan-based militias. However, after its war with Aidid (6 June -3 October) it adopted practically the same policy UNITAF had: bet on the warlords, persuade some of them to collaborate with you, get them to sign some sort of agreement, and get out.
By mid-March 1994 it had abandoned efforts to empower alternative, civilian Somali leadership. 87 Economically, too, the warlords, especially those in Mogadishu, gained enormously from UNOSOM II. In early 1994 the latter employed 11,000 Somalis in Mogadishu alone. An aid of Aidid controlled the currency exchange by which UNOSOM dollars were converted into Somali shillings;
another headed the local staffing office, which hired armed guards, drivers, and other personnel for the UN, and yet other Aidid associates rented houses and vehicles to the UN. On top of this, 'Aato, then still with Aidid, won large UN construction contracts that continued even during the war on Aidid, whose percentage on such contracts was estimated at 30-50%. 88 This increase in economic power directly led to a military strengthening of the warlords and, as the MHI entered its lame-duck phase, to serious infighting between and within armed factions about every important strategic resource, whether (formerly) national, public or private property. 89 In
Mogadishu and its hinterland, this meant the Mogadishu airport, seaport, and road to the airport; the banana plantations and other rich agricultural lands; fisheries and fishermen's labour, and so forth.
Under the apparently unseeing eyes of UNOSOM II, the USC leaders and rank-and-file militia members expanded into the large Mogadishu -Beledweyne -Kismaayo triangle, where they controlled trade and transportation routes, as well as agricultural production and fishing, and either displaced the existing population or subjected it to forced labour. 90 A part of the Jubba Valley (from Jamaame to Jilib) came under the control of 'Aato, who reportedly exploited local labour to grow bananas and marijuana for export. The local population suffered. 91 In contrast to UNITAF, which had as a matter of principle steered clear from involvement in violence between Somalis, UNOSOM II's failure to protect Somalis from warlord violence violated its explicit mandate 'to assume responsibility for the consolidation, expansion and maintenance of a secure environment throughout Somalia'. 92 UN/US forces did not protect Somali civilians from political violence such as dispossession, displacement, occupation, and exploitation, and had no orders to provide such protection. 93 Throughout the twenty-seven months of UNITAF and UNOSOM II presence, perpetrators of crimes against humanity enjoyed impunity and in many cases consolidated their gains. In spite of references to holding perpetrators accountable and helping Somalis reconcile, both stages of the MHI normalized and reinforced the power of the perpetrators of large-scale human rights violations in Somali politics and society.
UNOSOM II also failed to protect ordinary Somalis from disproportional violence perpetrated by its own troops. During the four months of warfare against Aidid in 1993, US and UN forces used disproportionate force that was completely unsuitable to warfare in a dense, urban environment and did not distinguish sufficiently between combatants and non-combatants. 94 Belgian authorities investigated first seven and then 268 cases, of which fifty-eight concerned death or serious injury. 100 During the Italian investigations, there was reference to 'an avalanche of murdered Somalis', 101 while the Belgian cases suggested the conclusion that for the soldiers 'inflicting pain' on Somali civilians 'was part of their everyday life'. 102 Razack found four commonalities in these widespread practices of abuse: soldiers committed them openly with others participating or present; soldiers recorded and documented them through video tapes, trophy photographs, and in diaries; the victims were often children and male youths and, finally, racism was a major and integral part of the motivation of the perpetrators. 103 That UNOSOM II was unable to protect ordinary Somali from political violence; lacked the interest and the will to do so, and itself added to the violence such Somalis were already suffering is a clear indication that military force overwhelmed its humanitarian dimension.
In the aftermath of the MHI in Somalia, the UN, US and most western countries turned their back on Somalia. Only after the terror attacks of September 2001 did the 'failed state' of Somalia gradually gain new international attention, mostly because of security concerns related to the increased prominence of Somali jihadist movements and the further internationalization of illegal economic activities, especially piracy. In Somalia, the civil war continued. Aidid proclaimed himself president in Four insights from this scholarship have a bearing on our hindsight understanding of the MHI in Somalia. The first is the insight, no longer new, that humanitarian aid 'has never been, and will never be, neutral', especially not in the context of complex and permanent emergencies, which most often involve civil wars in which the strong use illegal and violent means to gain power. 105 In such contexts, as was also true for the MHI in Somalia, humanitarian relief was both 'among the means of conducting the war and part of the prize'. 106 Second, in the Post-Cold War period, international HROs came to function, as McFalls put it, 'in close symbiosis with states and intergovernmental agencies'. 107 This intertwinement was both financial and organizational, as Western governments and intergovernmental organizations increasingly funneled development and humanitarian aid through HROs rather than directly to African governments. In the early 1990s, NGOs reportedly transferred more resources to Africa than the World Bank. 108 In the MHI in Somalia, this interconnection is also visible in the fact that UNITAF's mandate was not to provide food aid to starving Somalis but to protect the humanitarian agencies delivering that food, as well as in how HROs lobbied for the intervention and were incorporated into it. 109 Third, this scholarship has accused humanitarianism as a professional field and popular movement of using the morality of its motives and objectives to ignore the political contexts and dimensions of humanitarian interventions and MHIs. Such anti-political or 'politics-free' stances allow those implementing interventions, including HROs, to sidestep any serious form of accountability not only in terms of mandates, finances, human rights violations, and effectiveness but also with regard to the impact of political stances, actions, and their implications on the people interventions claim to assist. Such an anti-political stance, recently so evident in the approaches of human rights activists towards Darfur, was, as we saw above, also a central feature of UNITAF. 110 In the MHI in Somalia, the humanitarian magnanimity of the dramatic decision to send in almost 30,000 US troops to feed starving Somalis made the suitability of the form of intervention, the political dimensions of that decision, and accountability for its implementation appear irrelevant. This has led to an impunity that is almost absolute for UN, US, and Somali actors alike. This subject requires further research. 111 Fourth, already at the time of the MHI in Somalia, scholars such as Duffield had pointed out that, in complex or permanent emergencies, humanitarian disaster and political conflict were inherently connected and could not be 'treated' separately. After 2001 governments and inter-governmental organizations adopted a new overarching strategic vision of human security to which both humanitarian and development aid agendas and policies were now subordinated. The concept of human security, which had initially served as a measure of how groups of people were meeting their basic needs, became militarized; it was now incorporated in security strategies that aimed at keeping people in crisis secure enough to prevent their refugee flows, disease, terrorism, piracy, international criminal networks and so forth from reaching those not in crisis. In this conceptualization of security, populations of the South are no longer in need of development assistance that would usher them into modernity and a good life, as envisioned in the development paradigms of the 1970s and 1980s; they are, instead, in 
